Pokračuju ve čtení:
Sailing on High Sees: Reforming and Enlarging the EU for the 21st century (stránka:
https://institutdelors.eu/en/publicatio ... t-century/ ; pédefko:
https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/up ... REPORT.pdf), str. 20-23:
> 2. Decision-making in the Council
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> Today, most decisions are taken by qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council, especially when utilising the OLP. This is one of the prerequisites for a strong EU – not because Member States are continuously outvoted, but because the use of QMV gears negotiation dynamics towards compromise and coalition-making. Indeed, on average over 80 % of decisions taken by QMV in the Council are still taken by consensus, with no vote, and thus no loser. By contrast, acting in policy areas decided by unanimity has become more and more difficult. Some decisions are blocked by vetoes unconnected to the policy decision at hand and linked to other negotiations. Every accession to the EU adds more potential veto players, making unanimity exponentially harder to reach.
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> The use of QMV has always been seen as the most obvious solution for overcoming blockages in the Council. Its extension should be pursued. Yet it should be regarded as a contribution, but not as a panacea to solving the EU’s challenges in terms of its capacity to act. Indeed, it can change the negotiation dynamics towards compromise, but it is no solution to political challenges if the Union is split into two or more larger (and opposing) groups of Member States. It should also be stressed that QMV is an instrument best used sparingly; for common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in particular, striving for consensus should still be the main goal and QMV only used as a last resort.
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> Finally, the EU needs to find a balance between increasing its capacity to act and protecting legitimate national interests – every Member State has a set of issues over which it would prefer to preserve a veto right. The policy areas still decided by unanimity also generally touch more critical parts of national sovereignty – such as foreign policy, defence, tax or the EU budget. There is therefore a need to find a trade-off here.
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> Recommendations
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> • The generalisation of QMV
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> Before the next enlargement, all remaining policy decisions should be transferred from unanimity to QMV. Additionally, except for in CFSP, this should be accompanied by full co- decision with the EP (through the OLP) to ensure appropriate democratic legitimacy. Constitutional decisions, such as changing the EU treaties, accepting new members or adapting the EU institutions, should continue to be taken through unanimity.
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> At best, the decision towards a generalisation of QMV should be taken through the passerelle clause before enlargement, as currently discussed in CFSP. If an agreement on a generalisation of QMV is not possible, we recommend creating three distinct packages grouped by policy areas coming together and forming the basis of a gradual transition towards QMV. Negotiations must cover all three packages simultaneously and avoid making progress on just one policy area. They should achieve both a transition that is coherent within each policy area and a fair balance of concessions between individual Member States.
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> 1. Enlargement and the rule of law: Validating each negotiation chapter should be moved to QMV to streamline the enlargement process but the final ratification of an accession treaty would remain under unanimity. At the same time, Member States should accept the stricter enforcement of the rule of law by launching sanctions against any violation with a majority of four-fifths in the EUCO, as outlined in the above section on the rule of law.
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> 2. Foreign policy and defence: While a group of Member States is indeed currently pushing for more QMV in CFSP, the treaty excludes decisions with defence or military implications. However, foreign and security policy cannot be completely separated from defence. Potentially with the use of super-majorities (see below), EU decisions on defence initiatives (such as the use of the European Peace Facility or the European Defence Fund) should be transferred to QMV as part of CFSP. This would require an ordinary treaty change. This move to majority voting would not breach national sovereignty over the use of military force in the form of whether to contribute to EU military operations as this should remain a sovereign national decision[9].
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> [9] QMV in CFSP will however not solve the problem that the EU ohen does not produce consolidated posi1ons across policy areas which makes managing its external rela1ons difficult, including for the European External Action Service. This issue needs to be tackled within the Commission across DGs and the EAD.
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> 3. Fiscal and tax policy: The current treaty gives Member States veto rights for both policy decisions on tax harmonisation and EU fiscal decisions. This contributes to the inflexibility of the EU budget as well as difficulties in reaching any decision on tax policy. The EU should create the basis for both greater tax policy harmonisation for Member States but also a greater pool of common EU resources, which would be required to finance an enlarged EU and can only be achieved by matching decision-making on resources and spending.
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> • Making more QMV acceptable
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> In addition, in order to address the legitimate concerns of Member States regarding QMV and the protection of national interests as core state powers, the method for voting should be reviewed. For this, we make three recommendations:
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> First, if QMV is extended to additional policy areas, a ‘sovereignty safety net’ should be included. It could be modelled after Article 31(2) TEU [10] that allows Member States to voice their vital national interests in the very few decisions in CFSP which can already be taken by QMV. In new areas of QMV, if a Member State considers its vital national interest at stake, it could make a formal declaration and call for a transfer of the issue to the EUCO, in order to voice its reservations and find an agreement at the highest political level by consensus. In Article 31(2) TEU, the decision on whether to transfer a matter to the EUCO is taken by QMV in the Council. In our view, this provides a good balance between giving Member States the opportunity to voice their vital national interests and concerns, and the aim to find political consensus and increasing the EU’s capacity to act. This safety net could be included both within a limited transfer towards QMV as part of a passerelle decision, and as a general instrument as part of a wider transfer to QMV in preparation for enlargement.
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> [10] Article 31(2) TEU: ’If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adop@on of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity.’
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> Second, if part of a wider treaty change, the calculation of QMV voting shares should be rebalanced. Smaller to medium-sized Member States fear domination by the larger ones, as they can organise blocking minorities much more easily. The share of Member States and the population they represent should thus be adjusted. For instance, from the current system of 55 % of Member states representing 65 % of the EU population, it could be changed to 60 % of Member States representing 60 % of the population. For the most sovereignty-critical policy decisions, a ‘super majority’ requirement could be created, of ‘unanimity minus one’. It would need to be negotiated as part of a treaty change, in which EU policy decisions that currently fall under unanimity are so ‘sovereignty sensitive’ that they are transferred to ‘unanimity minus one’. This does not relate to constitutional decisions as these should remain under regular unanimity (see above).
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> Third, Member States should be able to opt-out of policy areas transferred to QMV, and potentially the OLP. This is only possible via a treaty revision and not with the use of the passerelle clause. Conceptually, this approach follows the UK model in the Treaty of Lisbon. As part of the transfer to the OLP in justice and home affairs, the UK was granted a protocol allowing it to opt-out of the decisions thus transferred after an examination period of five years. Unlike the UK protocol, however, new opt-outs should be limited to a block and not to individual measures, as this would create a highly fragmented ‘Europe à la carte’. The use of ‘constructive abstention’ in CFSP decisions is no substitute for this policy, as this form of abstention is purely voluntary and does not address the challenges of the EU’s capacity to act.
Tak předně jsem pátral po tom, co je to zmiňované EAD. A zdá se, že 'Europäischer Auswärtiger Dienst' (
https://european-union.europa.eu/instit ... ce-eeas_de ). Anglicky je to 'European External Action Service', zkratka EEAS,
https://european-union.europa.eu/instit ... ce-eeas_en .
Ale hlavně mi připadá, že se pro hlasování, nebo obecněji rozhodování, členských zemí, matlá různé s různým. Jedno různé je právo veta, nebo blokační menšina nebo něco takového. Obava nebýt přehlasován. Nevzdat se své "vládní" moci. Nevzdat se své "státní suverenity". Druhé různé je, jak počítat hlasy členských zemí - za prvé každá členská země je jeden hlas; za druhé podle počtu obyvatel. Třetí různé je odlišnost "demokratické legitimity"(?) hlasování členských zemí od hlasování Evropského parlamentu. Vlastně i v tom parlamentu se do toho nějak matlá počet obyvatel. Nebo-li ani Evropský parlament není osvobozen z členskozemského pohledu.
Nenavrhuju to jako vážně, ale jako myšlenkové cvičení. Nestačilo by mít Evropský parlament, kde by každý volič v Evropské unii byl zastoupen rovnoměrně, a "valné shromáždění" členských zemí, kde by každá členská země měla jeden hlas? To už určitě někdo navrhoval a popsal, čím to liší od současného stavu, nebo od návrhu dvanáctky.