Takhle knihu mají v Městké knihovně v Praze: https://search.mlp.cz/cz/vyjadreni/pova ... lo-eq:true
Anglický originál: Postwar: A history of Europe since 1945. Takhle ho mají v Oupn lajbrery: https://openlibrary.org/works/OL1894813 ... r?mode=all . Takhle v anglické vikypídyi: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postwar:_ ... Since_1945 .
(Hledání "Judt*" na Náměstí Praha 3: https://trojkatretiho.cz/search.php?keywords=Judt%2A .)
Přečetl jsem kapitolu 24 a vypisuju si:
Europe as a Way of Life
‘A free Health Service is a triumphant example of the superiority of
collective action and public initiative applied to a segment of society where
commercial principles are seen at their worst’.
Aneurin Bevan
‘We want the people at Nokia to feel we all are partners, not bosses and
employees. Perhaps that is a European way of working, but for us, it
works’.
Jorma Ollila (CEO, Nokia)
‘Europeans want to be sure that there is no adventure in the future. They
have had too much of that’.
Alfons Verplaetse (Governor, Belgian National Bank) 1996
‘America is the place to come when you are young and single. But if it is
time to grow up, you should return to Europe’.
(Hungarian businessman in public opinion survey, 2004)
‘Modern society . . . is a democratic society to be observed without
transports of enthusiasm or indignation’.
Raymond Aron
Tony Judt. Poválečná Evropa
Re: Tony Judt. Poválečná Evropa
Už jen název kapitoly 24 a mota ('epigraphs') na jejím začátku směřují k hodnotám(?). Způsobům? Mravům?
Leccos k hodnotám lze nalézt tady: https://bagarrosphere.fr/tags/ValuesEU .
A tady: https://trojkatretiho.cz/search.php?keywords=hodnot%2A .
Džat ('Judt') začne kapitolu mnohostí, bubláním, zmatkem, nejistotami a chybějící stejnorodostí sebevědomých popisů Evropy před první světovou válkou, ale hned se obrací k vynořování "odlišitelně evropské identity", k evropskému způsobu života:
> The burgeoning multiplicity of Europe at the end of the twentieth century: the variable geometry of its regions, countries and Union; the contrasting prospects and moods of Christianity and Islam, the continent’s two major religions; the unprecedented speed of communications and exchange within Europe’s borders and beyond them; the multiplicity of fault lines that blur what had once been clear-cut national or social divisions; uncertainties about past and future alike; all these make it harder to discern a shape to the collective experience. The end of the twentieth century in Europe lacks the homogeneity implicit in confident descriptions of the previous fin-de-siècle.
> All the same, there was emerging a distinctively European identity, discernible in many walks of life.
Pro mě poněkud překvapivě začne "vysokou kulturou", proběhne noviny a televizi, aby se podrobně věnoval sportu a zejména fotbalu. Evropskou úspěšnost fotbalu klade do protikladu k ztrátě zájmu o základní politické otázky a o politické strany. Za další oběť ztráty zájmu označuje "veřejného intelektuála". Od intelektuálů přejde k rozvratu Severoatlanitcké spolupráce a k rozbíhajícím se drahám Evropy a Spojených států. Všímá si rozdílných přístupů k otázkám vojenským / geopolitický, k mezinárodnímu právu. Všímá si hospodářské soutěže. Ale za nejdůležitější považuje všeobecné odtažení Evropanů od Spojených států:
> What was new about the situation at the beginning of the twenty-first century was that such sentiments were becoming commonplace, and had moved from the intellectual or political fringes deep into the center of European life. The depth and breadth of anti-American feeling in contemporary Europe far exceeded anything seen during the Vietnam War or even at the height of the peace movements of the early 1980s. Although a majority in most countries still believed that the Atlantic relationship could be preserved, three out of five Europeans in 2004 (many more than that in some countries, notably Spain, Slovakia and, strikingly, Turkey) thought strong American leadership in the world to be ‘undesirable’.
> ... even among mainstream commentators and politicians it was no longer commonplace to hold up American institutions or practices as a source of inspiration or an object to be emulated. For a long time America had been another time—Europe’s future. Now it was just another place.
Jasně, myšlenkové a hodnotové oddělení od Spojených států (anglosaského modelu / světa?) je důležité, ale co jsou tedy ty evropské hodnoty? Co je ten Evropský způsob života:
> Europeans had made a deliberate choice to work less, earn less—and live better lives. In return for their uniquely high taxes... Europeans received free or nearly free medical services, early retirement and a prodigious range of social and public services. Through secondary school they were better educated than Americans. They lived safer and—partly for that reason—longer lives, enjoyed better health (despite spending far less) and had many fewer people in poverty.
> This, then, was the ‘European Social Model’. It was without question very expensive. But for most Europeans its promise of job security, progressive tax rates and large social transfer payments represented an implicit contract between government and citizens, as well as between one citizen and another. According to the annual ‘Eurobarometer’ polls, an overwhelming majority of Europeans took the view that poverty was caused by social circumstances and not individual inadequacy. They also showed a willingness to pay higher taxes if these were directed to alleviating poverty.
Dále se Džat ('Judt') dostává k vztahu národních států a Unie:
> The European Union in 2005 had not superceded conventional territorial units and would not be doing so for the foreseeable future. Six decades after Hitler’s defeat, the multiple identities, sovereignties and territories that together defined Europe and its history certainly overlapped and inter-communicated more than at any time in the past. What was new, and thus rather harder for outside observers to catch, was the possibility of being French and European, or Catalan and European—or Arab and European.
> Europe remained what it had long been: a familiar accumulation of discrete state-particles.
> Considering what Europeans had done to one another in the first half of the twentieth century, this was rather remarkable. It certainly could not have been predicted from the rubble of 1945. Indeed, the re-emergence of Europe’s battered peoples and their distinctive national cultures and institutions from the wreckage of the continent’s thirty years’ war might well be thought an even greater achievement than their collective success in forging a transnational Union. The latter, after all, had been on various European agendas well before the Second World War and was if anything facilitated by the devastation wrought by that conflict. But the resurrection of Germany, or Poland, or France, not to speak of Hungary or Lithuania, had seemed altogether less likely.
A tudy se dostáváme k nově zrozené Evropě, jako možného vzoru a hráče na mezinárodní scéně:
> Even less predictable—indeed quite unthinkable just a few short decades before—was Europe’s emergence in the dawn of the twenty-first century as a paragon of the international virtues: a community of values and a system of inter-state relations held up by Europeans and non-Europeans alike as an exemplar for all to emulate. In part this was the backwash of growing disillusion with the American alternative; but the reputation was well earned. And it presented an unprecedented opportunity. Whether Europe’s burnished new image, scrubbed clean of past sins and vicissitudes, would survive the challenges of the coming century, however, would depend a lot on how Europeans responded to the non-Europeans in their midst and at their borders. In the troubled early years of the twenty-first century that remained an open question.
V roce 2005 Džat ('Judt') končí nadějí:
> But if patriotism for Europe could find a way to reach beyond itself... ‘stretching and expanding to embrace the whole of the civilized world’, then something more was now possible. The twentieth century—America’s Century—had seen Europe plunge into the abyss. The old continent’s recovery had been a slow and uncertain process. In some ways it would never be complete: America would have the biggest army and China would make more, and cheaper, goods. But neither America nor China had a serviceable model to propose for universal emulation. In spite of the horrors of their recent past—and in large measure because of them—it was Europeans who were now uniquely placed to offer the world some modest advice on how to avoid repeating their own mistakes. Few would have predicted it sixty years before, but the twenty-first century might yet belong to Europe.
O dvacet let později, ve čtvrtině století, naděje trvá, ještě jsme ji nepromarnili, ale ani ji nezačali plně uskutečňovat. A do toho se nám přimíchala poprvé od roku 1945 velká válka v Evropě. Je na nás, co s tím teď uděláme.
V Evropské unii je pro mě důležité spojení "hodnot" s funční jednotkou, která je dostatečně rozlehlá, lidnatá a mocná, aby své hodnoty uskutečňovala v sobě, i když se bude nacházet ve světě, který třeba je k těmto hodnotým nepřátelský, a zároveň aby nějak opatrně a žádoucím způsobem svět okolo sebe ovlivňovala.
Leccos k hodnotám lze nalézt tady: https://bagarrosphere.fr/tags/ValuesEU .
A tady: https://trojkatretiho.cz/search.php?keywords=hodnot%2A .
Džat ('Judt') začne kapitolu mnohostí, bubláním, zmatkem, nejistotami a chybějící stejnorodostí sebevědomých popisů Evropy před první světovou válkou, ale hned se obrací k vynořování "odlišitelně evropské identity", k evropskému způsobu života:
> The burgeoning multiplicity of Europe at the end of the twentieth century: the variable geometry of its regions, countries and Union; the contrasting prospects and moods of Christianity and Islam, the continent’s two major religions; the unprecedented speed of communications and exchange within Europe’s borders and beyond them; the multiplicity of fault lines that blur what had once been clear-cut national or social divisions; uncertainties about past and future alike; all these make it harder to discern a shape to the collective experience. The end of the twentieth century in Europe lacks the homogeneity implicit in confident descriptions of the previous fin-de-siècle.
> All the same, there was emerging a distinctively European identity, discernible in many walks of life.
Pro mě poněkud překvapivě začne "vysokou kulturou", proběhne noviny a televizi, aby se podrobně věnoval sportu a zejména fotbalu. Evropskou úspěšnost fotbalu klade do protikladu k ztrátě zájmu o základní politické otázky a o politické strany. Za další oběť ztráty zájmu označuje "veřejného intelektuála". Od intelektuálů přejde k rozvratu Severoatlanitcké spolupráce a k rozbíhajícím se drahám Evropy a Spojených států. Všímá si rozdílných přístupů k otázkám vojenským / geopolitický, k mezinárodnímu právu. Všímá si hospodářské soutěže. Ale za nejdůležitější považuje všeobecné odtažení Evropanů od Spojených států:
> What was new about the situation at the beginning of the twenty-first century was that such sentiments were becoming commonplace, and had moved from the intellectual or political fringes deep into the center of European life. The depth and breadth of anti-American feeling in contemporary Europe far exceeded anything seen during the Vietnam War or even at the height of the peace movements of the early 1980s. Although a majority in most countries still believed that the Atlantic relationship could be preserved, three out of five Europeans in 2004 (many more than that in some countries, notably Spain, Slovakia and, strikingly, Turkey) thought strong American leadership in the world to be ‘undesirable’.
> ... even among mainstream commentators and politicians it was no longer commonplace to hold up American institutions or practices as a source of inspiration or an object to be emulated. For a long time America had been another time—Europe’s future. Now it was just another place.
Jasně, myšlenkové a hodnotové oddělení od Spojených států (anglosaského modelu / světa?) je důležité, ale co jsou tedy ty evropské hodnoty? Co je ten Evropský způsob života:
> Europeans had made a deliberate choice to work less, earn less—and live better lives. In return for their uniquely high taxes... Europeans received free or nearly free medical services, early retirement and a prodigious range of social and public services. Through secondary school they were better educated than Americans. They lived safer and—partly for that reason—longer lives, enjoyed better health (despite spending far less) and had many fewer people in poverty.
> This, then, was the ‘European Social Model’. It was without question very expensive. But for most Europeans its promise of job security, progressive tax rates and large social transfer payments represented an implicit contract between government and citizens, as well as between one citizen and another. According to the annual ‘Eurobarometer’ polls, an overwhelming majority of Europeans took the view that poverty was caused by social circumstances and not individual inadequacy. They also showed a willingness to pay higher taxes if these were directed to alleviating poverty.
Dále se Džat ('Judt') dostává k vztahu národních států a Unie:
> The European Union in 2005 had not superceded conventional territorial units and would not be doing so for the foreseeable future. Six decades after Hitler’s defeat, the multiple identities, sovereignties and territories that together defined Europe and its history certainly overlapped and inter-communicated more than at any time in the past. What was new, and thus rather harder for outside observers to catch, was the possibility of being French and European, or Catalan and European—or Arab and European.
> Europe remained what it had long been: a familiar accumulation of discrete state-particles.
> Considering what Europeans had done to one another in the first half of the twentieth century, this was rather remarkable. It certainly could not have been predicted from the rubble of 1945. Indeed, the re-emergence of Europe’s battered peoples and their distinctive national cultures and institutions from the wreckage of the continent’s thirty years’ war might well be thought an even greater achievement than their collective success in forging a transnational Union. The latter, after all, had been on various European agendas well before the Second World War and was if anything facilitated by the devastation wrought by that conflict. But the resurrection of Germany, or Poland, or France, not to speak of Hungary or Lithuania, had seemed altogether less likely.
A tudy se dostáváme k nově zrozené Evropě, jako možného vzoru a hráče na mezinárodní scéně:
> Even less predictable—indeed quite unthinkable just a few short decades before—was Europe’s emergence in the dawn of the twenty-first century as a paragon of the international virtues: a community of values and a system of inter-state relations held up by Europeans and non-Europeans alike as an exemplar for all to emulate. In part this was the backwash of growing disillusion with the American alternative; but the reputation was well earned. And it presented an unprecedented opportunity. Whether Europe’s burnished new image, scrubbed clean of past sins and vicissitudes, would survive the challenges of the coming century, however, would depend a lot on how Europeans responded to the non-Europeans in their midst and at their borders. In the troubled early years of the twenty-first century that remained an open question.
V roce 2005 Džat ('Judt') končí nadějí:
> But if patriotism for Europe could find a way to reach beyond itself... ‘stretching and expanding to embrace the whole of the civilized world’, then something more was now possible. The twentieth century—America’s Century—had seen Europe plunge into the abyss. The old continent’s recovery had been a slow and uncertain process. In some ways it would never be complete: America would have the biggest army and China would make more, and cheaper, goods. But neither America nor China had a serviceable model to propose for universal emulation. In spite of the horrors of their recent past—and in large measure because of them—it was Europeans who were now uniquely placed to offer the world some modest advice on how to avoid repeating their own mistakes. Few would have predicted it sixty years before, but the twenty-first century might yet belong to Europe.
O dvacet let později, ve čtvrtině století, naděje trvá, ještě jsme ji nepromarnili, ale ani ji nezačali plně uskutečňovat. A do toho se nám přimíchala poprvé od roku 1945 velká válka v Evropě. Je na nás, co s tím teď uděláme.
V Evropské unii je pro mě důležité spojení "hodnot" s funční jednotkou, která je dostatečně rozlehlá, lidnatá a mocná, aby své hodnoty uskutečňovala v sobě, i když se bude nacházet ve světě, který třeba je k těmto hodnotým nepřátelský, a zároveň aby nějak opatrně a žádoucím způsobem svět okolo sebe ovlivňovala.
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